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CURRENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law-EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF INrENT ARISING FROM
PossEsSION OF BURGLARIOuS TooLs. The defendant, along with twro co-
defendants, was found guilty of felonious possession of burglarious tools
and implements with intent to commit a felony. The appeal was
founded on the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant an instruc-
tion to the effect that unless some evidence of a crime or an attempt
to commit a crime was shown there could be no conviction. On appeal
it was held that the trial court's refusal of the instruction was correct
and the conviction was affirmed.1
The court's view that no proof of a crime or an attempt to commit
a crime was necessary was predicated on a statutory presumption of
intent to commit a felony. In Virginia law, it is provided that "the
possession of burglarious tools, implements or outfit . .. shall be prima
facie evidence of an intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny." 2
In this portion of the statute, the court said, could be found the basis
for the presumption. The presumed intent is derived solely from the
possession of the type of implements commonly used in the commission
of the crime of burglary. In its interpretation of the statute the court
said that it was not necessary for the state to prove any intent but that
possession must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the prose-
cution proves possession by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt the
presumption of criminal intent cannot be invoked.3 Possession of such
implements may be proved by circumstantial evidence.4 The vital issue
is not the ownership of the tools but rather the possession of them by
the accused. This possession may be joint or several and two or more
persons may be in possession if each has the power of control and the
intent to control jointly.5 It was held in Commonwealth v. Robinson6
that the use of burglarious tools was constructive possession by tvo
or more persons engaged in a joint enterprise although actual custody
was in an accomplice. 7 This case was decided under a statute similar
to Virginia's. It is therefore logical to assume that the burden on the
1. Nance v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 428, 124 S.E2d 900 (1962).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-87 (1950).
3. Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 75 S.E2d 482 (1953).
4. Johnson v. State, 145 So.2d 156 (Miss. 1962).
5. 12 C.J.S. Burglary, § 69,754; see also, 9 As. JUR. Burglary, . 87, 282; State v.
McHentry, 207 Iowa 760, 223 N.W. 535 (1929).
6. 242 Ky. 98,45 S.W.2d 844 (1932).
7. See also, People v. Birnbaum, 208 App. Div. 476, 203 N.Y. Supp. 697 (1924).
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state to prove possession of burglarious implements is not a very difficult
one to carry.
However, mere possession is not a crime under the statute. It is pos-
session coupled with the intent to commit a crime that is punishable
under Virginia law. Once possession of the type of instrument com-
monly used in burglaries is proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
burden of going forward with the evidence to show a lack of the pre-
sumed intent shifts to the defendant. This does not, however, shift the
ultimate risk of non-persuasion from the prosecution, nor does it deprive
the defendant of his right to have the jury instructed on the presumption
of his innocence. Furthermore, it does not deprive the accused of any
defense he may have against the charge nor does it relieve the court
or the jury from their duty to determine all questions of fact from the
weight of all of the evidence.8 The statutory presumption is not con-
clusive. The accused may overcome the presumption by presenting
a reasonable explanation for his possession of the tools. The question of
whether or not the defendant has overcome the presumption has been
held to be a jury question. 9 In Wilborne v. Commonwealth"0 the court
held that the unexplained possession by the accused of the identical
instrument used in a breaking and entering coupled with possession of
other implements commonly used in burglaries and some of the goods
stolen from the building burglarized was sufficient to warrant a jury
verdict of guilty of housebreaking. The absence of a reasonable ex-
planation for possession of these articles justified the inference that the
accused was the perpetrator of the crime." When it appears from the
evidence that the accused has reasonably overcome the presumption by
explanation of his possession of the implements the jury shall find ac-
cordingly. 2 However, when the defendant cannot explain his presence
in an area far from his home at 4:30 A.M. and cannot satisfactorily ex-
plain his possession of tools adapted for breaking and entering, the court
or the jury will be justified in making an inference of burglarious in-
tent. 3
It can be concluded then that the real function of a presumption is
not evidential but rather is procedural. Its procedural effect is to fix
8. Burnette v. Commonwealth, supra note 2.
9. State v. Smith, 247 Iowa 500, 73 N.WV.2d 189 (1956).
10. 182 Va. 63, 28 S.E.2d 1 (1943).
11. Ibid.
12. People v. Polenisiak, 26 lll.2d 317, 186 N.E.2d 271 (1962).
13. People v. Faginkrantz, 21 111.2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
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upon the opposite party the burden of at least going forward with
evidence of the actual existence, or non-existence, of the presumed fact.14
In some jurisdictions there seems to be a question as to the extent of the
burden placed on the defendant. The duty may be to carry the whole
burden of proof, including the overall burden of persuasion, or merely
to introduce some evidence that is contrary to the presumption.15
The Federal Courts have imposed a stipulation on the'statutory pre-
sumption. In Benton v. United States 6 a statute making it a crime to
have possession of any implement which may reasonably be employed,
in the commission of a crime' 7 was held unconstitutional as to any
implement which does not in itself give rise to sinister inferences. This
followed the line set down in Tot v. United States'8 which held that
a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there is no rational con-
nection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.' 9
In setting down a doctrine of comparative convenience in shifting to
the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut
the presumption the Supreme Court said that the burden may be shifted
where such shifting will aid the accuser without subjecting the accused
to hardship or oppression.21 In Mobile, Jackson and Kansas City Rail-
road v. Turnipseed 2 it was held that legislation providing that proof
of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of the main presumed fact is
merely a rule of evidence and clearly within the scope of the general
powers of governments to enact legislation.
The rule as set down by the Virginia Court in Nance v. Common-
'wealth 2 seems to be the best rule as it places upon the defendant the
burden of providing a reasonable explanation for the possession of the
burglarious implements and seems to meet the reasonable connection
and comparative convenience tests of the Federal Courts.
Alfred S'wersky
14. Hale, Necessity of Logical Inference to Support a Presumption, 17 So. CAL. L.
REv. 48 (1943); for a discussion of statutory presumptions in general see Brosman,
The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. RFv. 17 (1930).
15. Note, 55 CoLuM. L. REv. 527 (1955).
16. 232 F.2d 341, (D.C. Cir. 1956).
17. D.C. CODE S 22-3601 (1951).
18. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
19. For a discussion of the Tot case, see Morgan, Constitutional Restrictions on
Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1943).
20. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
21. 219 U.S. 35 (1910); Accord, McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
22. Supra note 1.
